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Forthcoming, California Law Review (implicit bias symposium is-
sue) 
 
 
The Law of Implicit Bias 
Christine Jolls
∗
 and Cass R. Sunstein
**
 
 
Abstract 
Considerable attention has been given to the Implicit Asso-
ciation Test (IAT), which finds that most people have an 
implicit and unconscious bias against members of tradi-
tionally disadvantaged groups. Implicit bias poses a spe-
cial challenge for antidiscrimination law because it 
suggests the possibility that people are treating others dif-
ferently even when they are unaware that they are doing so. 
Some aspects of current law operate, whether intentionally 
or not, as controls on implicit bias; it is possible to imagine 
other efforts in that vein. An underlying suggestion is that 
implicit bias might be controlled through a general strat-
egy of “debiasing through law.” 
 
 
   ∗  Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
   **  Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School 
and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. For 
helpful discussions and suggestions on implicit bias and 
antidiscrimination law, we thank Ian Ayres, Richard Banks, Elizabeth 
Bartholet, Bert Huang, Alison Morantz, Eric Posner, Frederick 
Schauer, Reva Siegel, Peter Siegelman, Matthew Stephenson, Adrian 
Vermeule, and participants at workshops at Boston University School 
of Law, Columbia Law School, Fordham Law School, Harvard Law 
School, Stanford Law School, and Yale Law School. Martin Kurzweil 
provided outstanding research assistance. 
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Consider two pairs of problems: 
 
 1A. A regulatory agency is deciding whether to impose new re-
strictions on cloning mammals for use as food. Most people within the 
agency believe that the issue is an exceedingly difficult one, but in the 
end they support the restrictions on the basis of a study suggesting that 
cloned mammals are likely to prove unhealthy for human consump-
tion. The study turns out to be based on palpable errors. 
 
 1B. A regulatory agency is deciding whether to impose new re-
strictions on cloning mammals for use as food. Most people within the 
agency believe that the issue is an exceedingly difficult one, but in the 
end they support the restrictions on the basis of a “gut feeling” that 
cloned mammals are likely to be unhealthy to eat. It turns out that the 
“gut feeling,” spurred by a widely publicized event appearing to estab-
lish serious risk, is impossible to support by reference to evidence. 
 
 2A. An employer is deciding whether to promote Jones or Smith 
to a supervisory position at its firm. Jones is white; Smith is African-
American. The employer thinks that both employees are excellent, but 
it chooses Jones on the ground that employees and customers will be 
“more comfortable” with a white employee in the supervisory posi-
tion. 
 
 2B. An employer is deciding whether to promote Jones or Smith 
to a supervisory position at its firm. Jones is white; Smith is African-
American. The employer thinks that both employees are excellent, but 
it chooses Jones on the basis of a “gut feeling” that Jones would be 
better for the job. The employer is not able to explain the basis for this 
gut feeling; it simply thinks that “Jones is a better fit.” The employer 
did not consciously think about racial issues in making this decision; 
but, in fact, Smith would have been chosen if both candidates had been 
white.  
 
 In case 1A, the agency is violating standard principles of adminis-
trative law. Its decision lacks a “rational connection between facts and 
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judgment”1 and, thus, is most unlikely to survive judicial review. In 
case 1B, the agency is in at least equal difficulty; administrative 
choices must receive support from relevant scientific evidence.2  
 
 The second pair of cases is analytically parallel. Case 2A involves 
a conscious and deliberative judgment that clearly runs afoul of anti-
discrimination law.3 Case 2B might well seem equally troublesome. 
But in fact it is not at all clear that Smith would be able to prevail in 
case 2B, at least if there is no general pattern of race-based decision-
making by the employer. Smith will face a burden of proof that will be 
hard to surmount on the facts as stated.4 And note that these conclu-
sions apply even if the employer is (parallel to cases 1A and 1B) a 
government rather than a private actor; the administrative law and 
antidiscrimination law regimes treat “gut feelings” in quite different 
ways.  
 
 Case 2B is far from unrealistic in today’s world, as the present 
Symposium makes clear. A growing body of evidence, summarized by 
Anthony Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger,5 suggests that the 
real world is probably full of such cases of “implicit,” or unconscious, 
bias. This is likely to be true not only with respect to race, but also 
with respect to many other traits.6  
 
 
   1  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983). 
   2  Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 
2000).  
   3  See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial 
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 
GEO. L.J. 1619, 1623 (1991). 
   4  See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995). 
   5  See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit 
Bias:  Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
   6  See id.  
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 Much evidence of these forms of implicit bias comes from the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT), which has been taken by large and 
diverse populations on the Internet and elsewhere.7 The IAT asks indi-
viduals to perform the seemingly straightforward task of categorizing a 
series of words or pictures into groups. Two of the groups are racial or 
other categories, such as “black” and “white,” and two of the groups 
are the categories “pleasant” and “unpleasant.” In the version of the 
IAT designed to test for  implicit racial bias, respondents are asked to 
press one key on the computer for either “black” or “unpleasant” 
words or pictures and a different key for either “white” or “pleasant” 
words or pictures (a stereotype-consistent pairing); in a separate round 
of the test, respondents are asked to press one key on the computer for 
either “black” or “pleasant” words or pictures and a different key for 
either “white” or “unpleasant” words or pictures (a stereotype-
inconsistent pairing). Implicit bias against African-Americans is de-
fined as faster responses when the “black” and “unpleasant” categories 
are paired than when the “black” and “pleasant” categories are paired. 
The IAT is rooted in the very simple hypothesis that people will find it 
easier to associate pleasant words with white faces and names than 
with African-American faces and names—and that the same pattern 
will be found for other traditionally disadvantaged groups.  
 
 In fact, implicit bias as measured by the IAT has proven to be ex-
tremely widespread. Most people tend to prefer white to African-
American, young to old, and heterosexual to gay.8 Strikingly, members 
of traditionally disadvantaged groups tend to show the same set of 
preferences. The only major exception is that African-Americans 
themselves are divided in their preferences; half show a preference for 
African-Americans, while half show the opposite preference. Note, 
 
   7  See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan 
L.K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit 
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998); Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & 
Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and 
Beliefs from a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101 
(2002). 
   8  See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5. 
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however, that unlike whites, African-Americans taken as a whole 
show no preference for members of their own group.9
 
 It might not be so disturbing to find implicit bias in experimental 
settings if the results did not predict actual behavior, and in fact the 
relationship between IAT scores and behavior remains an active area 
of research.10 But we know enough to know that some of the time, 
those who demonstrate implicit bias also manifest this bias in various 
forms of actual behavior. For example, there is strong evidence that 
scores on the IAT and similar tests are correlated with third parties’ 
ratings of the degree of general friendliness individuals show to mem-
bers of another race.11 More particularly, “larger IAT effect scores pre-
dicted greater speaking time, more smiling, [and] more 
extemporaneous social comments” in interactions with whites as com-
pared to African-Americans.12 And it is reasonable to speculate that 
such uneasy interactions are associated with biased behavior. In the 
employment context in particular, even informal differences in treat-
ment may have significant effects on employment outcomes, particu-
larly in today’s fluid workplaces.13 If this is so, then the importance to 
 
   9  See id. 
   10  See, e.g., Alexander Green, Dana Carney & Mahzarin R. Banaji, 
Measuring Physicians’ Implicit Biases:  A New Approach To Studying 
Root Causes of Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health Care (working 
paper, 2005); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich, 
& Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges? 
(working paper, 2005). 
   11  See John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner, 
Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 66 (2002); Allen R. McConnell 
& Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, 
Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 
37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 439-40 (2001). For further 
discussion, see Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5. 
   12  McConnell & Leibold, supra note 11, at 439. 
   13  See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace 
Dynamics:  Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment 
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99-108 (2003). 
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legal policy is clear. If people are treated differently, and worse, be-
cause of their race or another protected trait, then the principle of anti-
discrimination has been violated, even if the source of the differential 
treatment is implicit rather than conscious bias. 
 
 It should not be controversial to suggest that in formulating and 
interpreting legal rules, legislatures and courts should pay close atten-
tion to the best available evidence about people’s actual behavior—an 
approach this Symposium terms “behavioral realism.”14 Indeed, the 
influence of economic analysis of law stems largely from its careful 
emphasis on the behavioral effects of legal rules. The need to attend to 
good evidence, applied to the domain of civil rights, animates the work 
in this Symposium. In much the same spirit, work in behavioral law 
and economics has argued in favor of incorporating psychological in-
sights about people’s actual behavior across a range of domains.15 We 
believe that there are productive links among all behavioral ap-
proaches to law, and one of the goals of our discussion below is to call 
attention to some of those links. We devote special attention to the 
promise of “debiasing” actors through legal strategies that are de-
signed to counteract biases of various sorts across a variety of do-
mains. 
 
 Our discussion below comes in three parts. Part I explores two 
systems of cognitive operations—roughly, “intuitive” and “delibera-
tive”—with the suggestion that the distinction between the two helps 
to illuminate legal responses to a wide range of behavioral problems, 
 
   14  For an in-depth discussion of “behavioral realism,” see Linda 
Hamilton Krieger & Susan Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law:  Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
   15  See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 
(1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science:  Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The 
“New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and 
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000). 
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including those raised by the IAT. Part II investigates the possibility of 
using the law to “debias” people in order to reduce implicit bias; we 
develop several illustrations of such debiasing, as well as relating the 
general approach of debiasing both to work that follows in this Sym-
posium and to work elsewhere in the legal literature. Part III investi-
gates some of the normative issues that are raised when regulators 
attempt to respond, through “debiasing” or otherwise, to implicit bias.  
 
 
I. 
System I and System II 
 
 Implicit bias of the sort manifested on the IAT has not generally 
been grouped with the “heuristics and biases” uncovered by research 
in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics.16 Thus far, the re-
ception within law of the two areas of research has been largely inde-
pendent. But we believe that legal responses to implicit bias are 
illuminatingly analyzed in terms that bring such bias in direct contact 
with cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. Most important, 
implicit bias—like many of the heuristics and biases emphasized else-
where—tends to have an automatic character, in a way that bears im-
portantly on its relationship to legal prohibitions. 
 
 In cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, much atten-
tion has been devoted to heuristics, which are mental shortcuts or rules 
of thumb that function well in many settings but lead to systematic er-
rors in others.17 Consider, for instance, the well-known finding by 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman involving people’s judgments 
 
   16  On heuristics and biases, see generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES: 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. 
eds., 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES]; JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. 
eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY]. 
   17  For general discussion of heuristics, see Daniel Kahneman & 
Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution 
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 16, at 
49-50. 
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about a thirty-one-year-old woman, Linda, who was concerned with 
issues of social justice and discrimination in college. People tend to 
say that Linda was more likely to be a “bank teller and active in the 
feminist movement” than to be a “bank teller.”18 This judgment is pat-
ently illogical, for a superset cannot be smaller than a set within it. The 
source of the mistake is the representativeness heuristic, by which 
events are seen to be more likely if they “look like” certain causes.19 In 
the Linda case, the use of the representativeness heuristic leads to a 
mistake of elementary logic—the conclusion that characteristics X and 
Y are more likely to be present than characteristic X. 
 
 Research in cognitive psychology emphasizes that heuristics of 
this kind frequently work through a process of “attribute substitution,” 
in which people answer a hard question by substituting an easier one.20 
For instance, people might resolve a question of probability not by in-
vestigating statistics, but by asking whether a relevant incident comes 
easily to mind.21 The same process is familiar in many contexts. Con-
fronted with a difficult problem in constitutional law, people might 
respond by asking about the views of trusted specialists—as, for ex-
ample, through the use of (say) the “Justice Scalia heuristic,” by which 
some people might answer the difficult problem by following the 
views of Justice Scalia. 
 
 Often, of course, people deliberately choose to use a heuristic, 
believing that it will enable them to reach accurate results. But some 
of the most important heuristics have been connected to “dual process” 
approaches, which have recently received considerable attention in the 
psychology literature.22 According to such approaches, people employ 
two cognitive systems. System I is rapid, intuitive, and error-prone; 
 
   18  Id. at 62. 
   19  See id. at 49-50. 
   20  See id. at 53. 
   21  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic 
for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 
208 (1973). 
   22  See generally DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999). 
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System II is more deliberative, calculative, slower, and often more 
likely to be error-free.23 Much heuristic-based thinking is rooted in 
System I, but it may be overridden, under certain conditions, by Sys-
tem II.24 Thus, for example, some people might make a rapid, intuitive 
judgment that a large German shepherd is likely to be vicious, but this 
judgment might be overcome after the dog’s owner assures them that 
the dog is actually quite friendly. Most people would be reluctant to 
drink from a glass recently occupied by a cockroach; but it is possible 
(though far from certain) that they would be willing to do so after con-
sidering a reliable assurance that, because the cockroach had been ster-
ilized by heat, the glass was not contaminated.25 In a context of greater 
relevance to law, heuristic-driven fears about eating cloned animals or 
genetically modified food might be overcome on the basis of careful 
studies suggesting that the risk of harm is quite low.26 Risk-related 
judgments are often founded in System I,27 and System II sometimes 
supplies a corrective. In other cases, however, responses within the 
System I domain itself may supply correctives, as discussed at some 
length in Parts II and III below. 
 
 We believe that the problem of implicit bias is best understood in 
light of existing analyses of System I processes. Implicit bias is largely 
automatic; the characteristic in question (skin color, age, sexual orien-
tation) operates so quickly, in the relevant tests, that people have no 
time to deliberate. It is for this reason that people are often surprised to 
find that they show the implicit bias. Indeed, many people say in good 
faith that they are fully committed to an antidiscrimination principle 
 
   23  A qualification is that a bad deliberative process might, of course, 
produce more errors than rapid intuitions. 
   24  See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 17, at 51.   
   25  See Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma:  Some Perspectives from 
the Study of Contagion, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: 
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 31, 32 (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001). 
   26  See id. 
   27  See the discussion of fear in JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL 
BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 
(1996). 
  
10 
                                                                                                                  
on the very ground on which they show a bias.28 When people exhibit 
bias toward African-Americans, System II may of course be involved, 
as in case 2A above, but in a great many cases System I is the culprit. 
In case 2B above, the employer has no conscious awareness of the role 
race played in its decision to hire Jones over Smith; in fact, the em-
ployer might regard its decision as a “mistake,” either factually or 
morally, if it were aware of the role race played.  
 
 In responding to implicit bias understood in this way, the legal 
system could emphasize System II; perhaps the law could produce or 
encourage a System II override of the System I impulse. But it is also 
possible that interventions within the domain of System I itself would 
be more efficacious—although perhaps raising distinctive normative 
objections.  We explore these possibilities in the next two Parts.29  
 
   28  See, e.g., Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1474-
75. 
   29  The legal literature on implicit bias is by now enormous. Recent 
work emphasizing the IAT in particular includes IAN AYRES, 
PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND 
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 419-25 (2001); Mijha Butcher, Using 
Mediation To Remedy Civil Rights Violations When the Defendant Is 
Not an Intentional Perpetrator, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 225, 
238-40 (2003); Mary Anne Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being 
Discriminated Against, 55 STAN L. REV. 2273, 2290-91 (2003); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes 
of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1542-56 (2004); 
Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Gender Bias Studies, 58 WASH. & 
L. REV. 1073, 1080 n.35 (2001); Lateef Mtima, The Road to the 
Bench: Not Even Good (Subliminal) Intentions, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 135, 155-58 (2001); Marc. R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias 
at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 459, 489-91 (2003); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-
Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal 
Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 959-64 
(1999); Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1023, 1051 n.144 (2002); Michael S. Shin, Redressing Wounds:  
Finding a Legal Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical 
  
11 
                                                                                                                  
II. 
Antidiscrimination Law and “Debiasing” 
 
 From the standpoint of a legal system that seeks to forbid differ-
ential treatment based on race and other protected traits, implicit bias 
presents obvious difficulties. In many cases entirely unaware of their 
bias and how it shapes their behavior, people will frequently fail to 
override their System I inclinations. Ordinary antidiscrimination law 
will often face grave difficulties in ferreting out implicit bias even 
when this bias produces unequal treatment.30
 
 Of course, antidiscrimination law has long forbidden various 
forms of differential treatment on the basis of race and other protected 
traits. If, for example, a state official treats someone worse because of 
race, there might well be a violation of the Constitution as well as 
antidiscrimination statutes. Some of the hardest cases present problems 
of proof:  if there is no “smoking gun,” how can bias be established? 
There are also vexing conceptual questions. What, exactly, does the 
category of unlawful “discrimination” include?31 However the hardest 
questions are resolved, it seems clear that when System I is producing 
differential treatment, the legal system will often encounter unusually 
serious difficulties.  
 
 The parallels described above between implicit bias and the heu-
ristics and biases emphasized by cognitive psychology and behavioral 
economics help to illuminate the primary approaches the law can 
adopt in response to unequal treatment stemming from implicit bias. In 
the domain of heuristics and biases, the law has now-familiar methods 
 
Care, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 2047, 2066-68 (2002); Megan Sullaway, 
Psychological Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 250, 256 (2004); and Joan C. Williams, The Social 
Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender 
Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 446-47 (2003).  
   30  See sources cited infra note 42. 
   31  See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming 
of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989). 
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with which to respond.32 In the context of “hindsight bias,” for exam-
ple, the law protects against error by broadly restricting adjudicators’ 
ability to reconsider decisions from the perspective of hindsight.33 
Likewise, in the area of consumer behavior, many people believe that 
consumers show unrealistic optimism in evaluating potential product 
dangers, and the law may respond by imposing a range of restrictions 
on their choices.34 These approaches attempt to insulate outcomes from 
the problems created by heuristics and biases, which themselves are 
taken as a given. Such insulating strategies are readily imaginable in 
the antidiscrimination law domain, as explored in Part II.A below.  
 
 Social scientists have also focused substantial attention on the 
possibility of debiasing in response to heuristics and biases.35 The law 
might engage in such debiasing as well, seeking to reduce people’s 
level of bias rather than to insulate outcomes from its effects.36 If, for 
instance, consumers suffer from unrealistic optimism, then regulators 
might respond not by banning certain transactions or otherwise re-
stricting consumer choice but instead by working directly on the un-
derlying mistake.37 They might, for example, enlist the availability 
heuristic, according to which people estimate the likelihood of events 
based on how easily they can imagine or recall examples of such 
events.  Drawing on availability, regulators might then offer concrete 
examples of harm in order to help consumers understand risks more 
accurately. In the domain of smoking, an emphasis on specific in-
stances of harm does appear to increase people’s estimates of the like-
 
   32  See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 199-201 (2006). 
   33  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of 
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 619-23 (1998).  
   34  See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 207-08. 
   35  The seminal work is Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 16, at 422.  
   36  See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 200-01. 
   37  See id. at 209-16.  
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lihood of harm.38 Attention to strategies for what we have elsewhere 
termed “debiasing through law” can help both to understand and to 
improve the legal system.39 Note that many of these strategies—
including the example just given of harnessing the availability heuris-
tic—reflect System I rather System II responses to System I problems. 
Debiasing strategies may also be applied in the domain of antidis-
crimination law. We offer a series of illustrations—as well as relating 
the general approach of debiasing to work in this Symposium and 
elsewhere in the legal literature—in Parts II.B. and II.C below. 
 
A. Insulation 
 
 When people show bias on the basis of race or another protected 
trait, the most conventional legal response is to attempt to insulate out-
comes from the effects of such bias. Because, for instance, certain 
forms of employment behavior are unlawful under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,40 people will face monetary and other liabil-
ity for engaging in such behavior. The desire to avoid such liability 
should, on the traditional view, deter the prohibited behavior. The 
point is particularly obvious with respect to consciously biased behav-
ior of the sort at issue in case 2A above. There is no question that such 
behavior is squarely prohibited by antidiscrimination law, and—
because the behavior is conscious—actors can be expected to respond 
to legal incentives not to engage in it, at least if people care enough 
about complying with the law (or at least if the penalties are stiff 
enough for those who are deterred only by actual sanctions). With re-
spect to conscious bias, existing law attempts not to “debias” people—
by reducing their conscious bias on the basis of race or another pro-
tected trait (although this may be a longer-term effect of the law)—but 
to insulate outcomes from the effects of such bias.41
 
   38  See FRANK A. SLOAN, V. KERRY SMITH, & DONALD H. TAYLOR, 
JR., THE SMOKING PUZZLE:  INFORMATION, RISK PERCEPTION, AND 
CHOICE 157-79 (2003). 
   39  See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 202, 206-24. 
   40  42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e17 (2000). 
   41  Linda Hamilton Krieger nicely summarizes this effect of existing 
antidiscrimination law:   
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 A central problem in today’s world, however, is the possibility 
that many people act in response to implicit bias. In response, legal 
rules might seek to reduce the likelihood that implicit bias will pro-
duce differential outcomes; but it would be quite difficult to conclude 
that current antidiscrimination law adequately achieves this goal.42 As 
 
[On the traditional view], if an employee’s protected 
group status is playing a role in an employer’s 
decisionmaking process, the employer will be aware of 
that role . . . . Equipped with conscious self-awareness, 
well-intentioned employers become capable of 
complying with the law’s proscriptive injunction not to 
discriminate. They will monitor their decisionmaking 
processes and prevent prohibited factors from affecting 
their judgments. 
Krieger, supra note 4, at 1167. 
   42  The scholarly literature critiquing existing antidiscrimination law, 
both constitutional and statutory, for its general failure to address the 
problem of implicit bias is voluminous. See, e.g., Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006)  (“Unconscious bias, 
interacting with today’s ‘boundaryless workplace,’ generates 
inequalities that our current antidiscrimination law is not well 
equipped to solve.”) (citation omitted); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a 
Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 
104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2018-30 (1995) (concluding that existing 
employment discrimination law would not provide relief for an 
employee who was disadvantaged by the implicit use of criteria that 
are more strongly associated with whites than nonwhites); Barbara J. 
Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”:  White Race Consciousness and 
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 958 
(1993) (stating that existing Equal Protection Clause doctrine 
“perfectly reflects” whites’ failure to “scrutinize the whiteness of 
facially neutral norms”); Green, supra note 13, at 111 (“[E]xisting 
Title VII doctrine . . . is ill-equipped to address the forms of 
discrimination that derive from organizational structure and 
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institutional practice in the modern workplace”); Krieger, supra note 
4, at 1164 (arguing that the way in which employment discrimination 
law “constructs discrimination, while sufficient to address the 
deliberate discrimination prevalent in an earlier age, is inadequate to 
address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias” prevalent today); 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 
(1987) (stating that existing Equal Protection Clause doctrine “ignores 
much of what we understand about how the human mind works” and 
“disregards . . . the profound effect that the history of American race 
relations has had on the individual and collective unconscious”); R.A. 
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in 
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 878 (2004) (recognizing the 
“limitations inherent in the Supreme Court’s current approach to racial 
stigma” under the Equal Protection Clause); Ian F. Haney López, 
Institutional Racism:  Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 109 YALE L. J. 1717, 1830-43 (2000) (describing the 
gap between subtle forms of discriminatory conduct and current Equal 
Protection Clause doctrine); David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent 
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 972 (1992) (stating that while 
“much employment discrimination” results from unintentional 
behavior, “the courts have looked at employment discrimination as a 
problem of conscious, intentional wrong-doing”); Antony Page, 
Batson’s Blind-Spot:  Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 179-80 (2005) (arguing that existing 
Equal Protection Clause doctrine in the context of peremptory 
challenges to jurors fails to respond in an effective manner to 
implicitly biased behavior); Poirier, supra note 29, at 459-63 
(criticizing, in light of evidence of implicitly biased behavior, the 
focus of employment discrimination law on various forms of 
intentional misconduct); Reshma M. Saujani, “The Implicit 
Association Test”:  A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative 
Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 413 (2003) (asserting 
that existing Equal Protection Clause doctrine is “incapable of rooting 
out racial discrimination where it is most pernicious”); Reva Siegel, 
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1137 (1997) 
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Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan Fiske illustrate in their contribution 
to this Symposium, recent trends in antidiscrimination law seem to 
leave much implicitly biased behavior unpoliced in the employment 
context.43 Krieger and Fiske suggest, for instance, that most courts 
have now made explicit that any facially neutral basis for an em-
ployer’s decision will, if honestly although mistakenly or foolishly 
held, suffice to defeat a claim of intentional discrimination under Title 
VII.44 As Krieger and Fiske powerfully demonstrate, an “honest” con-
cern about an employee may very often be both “honest” and (unbe-
knownst to the decisionmaker) entirely a product of the employee’s 
status as an African-American worker.45
 
 It is important not to overstate the point. In discrete corners of ex-
isting antidiscrimination law and policy, it is possible to find promis-
ing attempts to insulate outcomes from the effects of implicit bias. 
Consider, for example, the affirmative action plans seen at all levels of 
government.46 Such plans can illuminatingly be understood—in light 
of the analysis of Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji in this Symposi-
um47—as attempts by the state to correct for implicit bias, and thus to 
break the connection between such bias and outcomes. If, as Kang and 
 
(stating that “the empirical literature on racial bias” suggests that 
“most race-dependent governmental decisionmaking will elude equal 
protection scrutiny”). For further discussion of many of these 
critiques, see Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on 
Implicit Bias (forthcoming 2006, Kluwer Academic Publishers). 
   43  See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 14. 
   44  See id. 
   45  See id.; see also Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification 
Theory and Research:  Implication for Legal Advocacy and Social 
Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).  
   46  See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
   47  See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral 
Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006). Kang and Banaji ultimately limit their analysis, 
however, to specific forms of (what is conventionally regarded as) 
affirmative action. See id. 
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Banaji suggest, assessments of merit are inappropriately clouded by 
implicit bias, then a preference for those harmed by the biased assess-
ments can help prevent the implicit bias from being translated into fi-
nal outcomes.48 If implicit bias typically leads an African-American 
employee to be incorrectly evaluated as worse than a white counter-
part, an appropriately tailored affirmative action plan can counteract 
this mistake. And, likewise, antidiscrimination law’s framework for 
assessing the legality of affirmative action plans can be understood as 
enabling employers, educational institutions, and other organizations 
to use such plans to break the connection between implicit bias and 
outcomes, as Kang and Banaji also suggest.49
 
B. “Direct Debiasing” 
 
 In addition to the “insulating” strategies discussed in Part II.A, it 
is often possible for government to target implicit bias more directly. 
If decisionmakers, wholly without their intent and indeed to their great 
chagrin, are acting on the basis of race or another protected trait, the 
law may be able to help them to correct their unintended actions. De-
biasing solutions reflect this approach, and we now turn to those solu-
tions. Below we develop several illustrations of debiasing through 
antidiscrimination law, as well as relating the general approach of de-
biasing through this body of law to work by others in this Symposium 
and elsewhere in the legal literature. 
 
 
   48  See id. Ann McGinley and Michael Selmi have also discussed the 
problem of implicit bias and noted that affirmative action is a way to 
ensure that employment opportunities of protected groups do not 
suffer as a result of such bias. See Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging 
Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action:  A Critical Perspective on 
the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision 
Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1044-46, 1048-49 
(1997); Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the 
Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1284-89, 1297 
(1995). 
   49  See Kang & Banaji, supra note 47. 
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 In the most obvious form of debiasing, antidiscrimination law ei-
ther does or could act directly to reduce the level of people’s implicit 
bias. Consider four examples of such “direct debiasing.”  
 
1. Prohibiting Consciously Biased Decisionmaking 
 
 The central focus of existing antidiscrimination law is on prohibit-
ing consciously biased decisionmaking—a focus that has produced 
intense criticism from those interested in implicit bias.50 Thus, it is 
easy to overlook the way in which existing antidiscrimination law, de-
spite its focus on conscious bias, nonetheless has some effect on the 
level of implicit bias. A key causal path here is that the prohibition on 
consciously biased decisionmaking in workplaces, educational institu-
tions, and membership organizations naturally tends to increase popu-
lation diversity in these entities, and population diversity in turn has a 
significant effect on the level of implicit bias.51 Put differently, while 
the prohibition on consciously biased behavior prompts a System II 
response to the System II phenomenon of conscious bias, it also yields 
a System I response to the System I phenomenon of implicit bias. 
 
 A significant body of social science evidence supports the conclu-
sion that the presence of population diversity in an environment tends 
to reduce the level of implicit bias.52 In one particularly striking study, 
 
   50  See sources cited supra note 42. 
   51  See Jolls, supra note 42.    
   52  Leading studies include Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, 
Seeing Is Believing:  Exposure to Counterstereotypic Women Leaders 
and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes, 40 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 651-52 (2004); Brian S. 
Lowery, Curtis D. Hardin & Stacey Sinclair, Social Influence Effects 
on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
842, 844-45, 846-47 (2001); Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, 
Effects of Situational Power on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 179-81 (2003). Kang and Banaji 
provide additional discussion of supportive evidence, including a 
recent meta-study by Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp. See Kang & 
Banaji, supra note 47. 
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the simple fact of administration of an in-person IAT by an African-
American rather than a white experimenter significantly reduced the 
measured level of implicit bias.53 Put differently, people’s speed in 
characterizing black-unpleasant and white-pleasant pairs was closer to 
their speed in characterizing black-pleasant and white-unpleasant pairs 
when the African-American experimenter was present. Another study 
found that white test subjects paired with an African-American partner 
exhibited less implicit bias as measured by the IAT than white test 
subjects paired with a white partner; the same study found that within 
pairs involving an African-American partner, participants who were 
told they were to evaluate the African-American partner exhibited 
more implicit racial bias on the IAT than participants who were told 
they would be evaluated by the African-American partner.54  
 
 The effects of population diversity in the environment on the level 
of implicit bias may stem from the availability heuristic discussed in 
Part I; people often tend to assess probabilities based on whether a 
relevant incidence comes easily to mind. The effects of diversity may 
also reflect a more general role for the “affect heuristic,” by which de-
cisions are formed by reference to rapid, intuitive, affective judg-
ments.55  
 
 It follows from these findings that simply by increasing the level 
of population diversity in workplaces, educational institutions, and 
other organizations, existing antidiscrimination law almost certainly 
tends to reduce the level of implicit bias in these environments.56 It 
bears emphasis in this connection that antidiscrimination law’s clear 
rejection of explicit quotas counters the risk that this law might para-
doxically increase implicit bias by means of overly heavy-handed di-
 
   53  See Lowery, Hardin & Sinclair, supra note 52, at 844-45, 846-47.  
   54  See Richeson & Ambady, supra note 52, at 181 & tbl.1. 
   55  See Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. 
MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra 
note 16, at 397, 397-400. 
   56  See Jolls, supra note 42. 
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versity initiatives.57 A closely related point is important: existing anti-
discrimination law’s effects on implicit bias through increased popula-
tion diversity may be greatest in cases in which people’s initial levels 
of implicit bias represent errors in judgment as opposed to statistically 
accurate perceptions. As discussed in Part I above, implicit bias, like 
the heuristics and biases emphasized in cognitive psychology and be-
havioral economics, may often reflect a genuine factual error; but of 
course this may not always be the case. If implicit bias corresponds to 
statistically accurate perceptions about the group in question, then the 
effects of population diversity may be muted by conflicting signals 
corresponding to the statistical reality.  
 
2. Prohibiting Hostile Environments 
 
 Existing antidiscrimination law’s prohibition on “hostile envi-
ronments” is also likely to reduce the level of implicit bias in work-
places, educational institutions, and other organizations, here through 
its effect on the physical and sensory environment.58 Again, what is 
generally viewed as a System II response to a System II problem is 
also a System I response to a System I problem.  
 
 
   57  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) (2000) (“Nothing contained in 
[Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant 
preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group 
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total 
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin employed by any employer . . . in comparison with the 
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in 
the available work force in any community, State, section, or other 
area.”). For discussion of the ways in which some types of explicit 
preferential treatment of particular groups can increase bias against 
these groups, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: 
Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 
1263-70 (1998). 
   58  See Jolls, supra note 42. 
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 Both evidence and common sense suggest that the presence of 
stereotypic images of a particular group tends to increase implicit 
bias.59 A particularly striking study, outside the direct context of meas-
ures of implicit bias, found that men who had viewed a pornographic 
film just before being interviewed by a woman remembered little 
about the interviewer other than her physical characteristics—while 
men who had watched a regular film before the interview had mean-
ingful recall of the content of the interview.60 Heuristics such as avail-
ability and affect may again be in play.61
 
 Under current antidiscrimination law, hostile environments featur-
ing negative or demeaning depictions of protected groups are gener-
ally unlawful in workplaces, educational institutions, and membership 
organizations.62 In this way, current law governing sexual and racial 
harassment almost certainly produces some effect on the level of im-
plicit bias in these institutions.63 Compared to an environment in which 
such demeaning depictions were not unlawful, the current framework 
is likely to have a debiasing effect. 
 
 The prohibition on hostile environments may be felt throughout 
the organization, not merely by those directly targeted by the behavior. 
The law does not simply protect an immediate victim or set of victims 
 
   59  See, e.g., Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma & Alison P. Lenton,  
Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes 
Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 828, 
832-33 (2001). 
   60  See Doug McKenzie-Mohr & Mark P. Zanna, Treating Women as 
Sexual Objects: Look to the (Gender Schematic) Male Who Has 
Viewed Pornography, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 296, 
303-04 (1990), discussed in Jolls, supra note 42. 
   61  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
   62  See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (workplace 
environment under Title VII); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 
526 U.S. 629 (1999) (school environment under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972); Minn. Stat. §363A.11 subd. 1 
(2005) (voluntary organization environment under state law).  
   63  See Jolls, supra note 42. 
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from behavior deemed to be unlawful; instead the law tends to shape 
and affect the level of implicit bias of all those present. Of course, the 
law does not target people’s beliefs as such; the point is that in pro-
scribing certain conduct it undoubtedly has an effect on the level of 
implicit bias.64
 
3. The Requirements for Employers Seeking to Avoid Vicarious  
 Liability 
 
 A third example of a direct debiasing mechanism involves poten-
tial reforms of the existing doctrine governing employers’ vicarious 
liability for Title VII violations. At present that doctrine allows em-
ployers to defend against such liability on the basis of actions such as 
manuals or training videos disseminated in the workplace.65
 
 Just as there are biasing effects (described just above) from nega-
tive imagery in the physical environment, there is strong evidence of 
debiasing effects from favorable portraiture or imagery—for instance, 
photographs of Tiger Woods—in the physical environment.66 People 
show significantly less bias on the IAT in the presence of Woods’s 
picture—and also when tested again twenty-four hours after exposure 
to the picture.67  Thus, in the real world, if portraiture in the workplace 
or elsewhere consistently reflects positive exemplars, it is likely—
though certainly not guaranteed68—that those present will show less 
implicit bias, with likely mechanisms once more being the availability 
and affect heuristics.69  
 
   64  See id. 
   65  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Kolsted 
v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). 
   66  See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the 
Malleability of Automatic Attitudes:  Combating Automatic Prejudice 
with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803-04 (2001). 
   67  See id. 
   68  See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5 (raising caution about 
longer term effects of positive imagery). 
   69  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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 Note that in contrast to the experimental setting, positive exem-
plars in the workplace or elsewhere would be a recurrent rather than 
fleeting aspect of the individual’s environment. And, as above, the 
manner in which the display of positive exemplars occurs is important; 
if it is too heavy-handed, implicit bias may not decrease at all (and 
could even increase).70
 
 In light of the available evidence, it may make a good deal of 
sense to treat an employer’s positive effort to portray diversity as an 
express factor weighing against vicarious employer liability under Ti-
tle VII. This approach would be parallel to the way that, under current 
Title VII doctrine, employers regularly defend against such liability on 
the basis of actions such as manuals or training videos disseminated in 
the workplace.71 Our basic suggestion is that the existing Title VII ap-
proach to employers’ vicarious liability might be extended beyond the 
discrete mechanisms (manuals, handbooks, videos, internet instruc-
tional programs) contemplated by present law—at least if doing so is 
consistent with the First Amendment (a question beyond the scope of 
the present discussion). While many of the mechanisms contemplated 
by present law governing vicarious liability are distinctly System II in 
character, the evidence suggests the important role of System I mecha-
nisms in reducing implicit bias. The display of positive exemplars in 
the work place may do far more to reduce implicit bias than yet an-
other mandatory training session on workplace diversity. 
 
4. Affirmative Action Policy 
 
 Existing affirmative action policy can also be understood as a 
form of direct debiasing. We have already noted that at all levels of 
government, officials have chosen to adopt affirmative action plans.72 
Because population diversity helps to reduce implicit bias through 
mechanisms including availability and affect (as described above), 
 
   70  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
   71  See sources cited supra note 65. 
   72  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
  
24 
                                                                                                                  
these government affirmative action plans may operate as a form of 
direct debiasing.73
 
 To be sure, government affirmative action may fail to debias peo-
ple—and might even increase implicit bias depending on a given 
plan’s specific contours. Krieger, while noting how affirmative action 
may reduce bias,74 has explored the possible negative effects of af-
firmative action on the level of bias with reference to the existing so-
cial science literature,75 and the question of whether and when such 
negative effects will occur is obviously a crucial one. From the stand-
point of reducing implicit bias, the good news is that the empirical 
studies discussed above highlight the potential of increased diversity 
to reduce implicit bias, while the evidence discussed by Krieger pro-
vides many insights on the specific types of affirmative action plans 
that do and do not appear to have negative effects on the level of 
bias.76
 
 Our analysis of affirmative action here differs from Kang and Ba-
naji’s insulating analysis of affirmative action, discussed in Part II.A 
above. In the conception here, government affirmative action does not 
act to insulate outcomes from the effects of implicit bias but, instead, 
acts directly to reduce such bias.77 Of course, a government affirmative 
action plan may have both types of effects simultaneously. 
 
   73  See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law 
(unpublished manuscript, Yale Legal Theory Workshop, Dec. 4, 
2003). 
   74  See Krieger, supra note 57, at 1275-76. 
   75  See id. at 1263-70. 
   76  See id. 
   77  Analyses of affirmative action and implicit bias in the existing 
legal literature have often not been specific about which sort of 
mechanism—“insulating” or “debiasing” in our terms—produces the 
effect of an affirmative action plan; both mechanisms may be 
contemplated. See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention 
Justification for Affirmative Action, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1385, 1395-96 
(2003); cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, 
Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 7, 26-29, 77-94 (2000) 
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* *    * 
 
 Let us offer a concluding comment about all of the methods of 
direct debiasing explored in this section. Uniting all of these methods 
is the general idea that government does or might act against implicit 
bias using System I rather than System II mechanisms. The direct de-
biasing approaches described here thus mark a substantial departure 
from alternative efforts focused on “deliberate ‘mental correction’ that 
takes group status squarely into account.”78 We discuss normative is-
sues arising out of this System I–System II difference in Part III be-
low. 
 
C. “Indirect Debiasing” 
 
 We now turn to mechanisms for what we call “indirect debias-
ing”—mechanisms that receive sustained and insightful treatment in 
this Symposium in the work by Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan 
Fiske and the work by Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji.79 Under indi-
rect debiasing mechanisms, law prohibits or permits certain behavior 
and, as an indirect result of the prohibition or permission, creates in-
centives (or avoids disincentives) for regulated actors to adopt a debi-
asing approach. We consider two examples. 
 
1. A Prohibition on Implicitly Biased Behavior? 
 
 Many scholars suggest that existing antidiscrimination law does 
little to police implicitly biased behavior.80 A variety of proposed re-
forms, including those proposed by Krieger and Fiske in this Sympo-
 
(discussing how population diversity from affirmative action may 
reduce various forms of bias including conscious bias, but expressing 
pessimism about the possibility of altering implicit bias). 
   78  See Krieger, supra note 57, at 1279. 
   79  Krieger & Fiske, supra note 14; Kang & Banaji, supra note 47. 
   80  See sources cited supra note 42.  
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sium, would broaden the reach of antidiscrimination law in addressing 
that behavior.81  
 
  It is obvious that if antidiscrimination law were to proscribe im-
plicitly biased behavior in an effective manner, the law would encour-
age employers to adopt mechanisms to reduce implicit bias. 
(Obviously, the greater the translation of implicit bias to implicitly bi-
ased behavior, the greater the incentive for employers.) Following the 
discussion above, such mechanisms could include population diversity 
in the organization (Parts II.B.1 and II.B.4) and careful attention to 
depictions of protected groups in the physical environment (Parts 
II.B.2 and II.B.3). The discussion above described how those steps 
tend to reduce the level of implicit bias. 
 
 Alternatively, effective prohibition of implicitly biased behavior 
could encourage employers to adopt general decisionmaking structures 
or processes that reduce the intensity and frequency of implicit bias, 
implicitly biased behavior, or both. In the words of one commentator, 
steps may include “creating interdependence among in-group and out-
group members, providing structure and guidance for appraisal and 
evaluation, and making decisionmakers accountable for their deci-
sions.”82 It is unclear whether the mechanisms in play here will be pre-
dominantly System I or System II in nature. In a related vein, Susan 
Sturm has recounted how major accounting firm offices came to rec-
ognize and address sex-based disparities in assignments through the 
simple step of having the office managing partners list the nature and 
quantity of assignments to employees by sex.83 (They were very sur-
 
   81  See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 42, at 991-1017; Krieger, supra note 
4, at 1186-1217, 1241-44; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 14; Lawrence, 
supra note 42, at 355-81; Poirier, supra note 29, at 478-91; Saujani, 
supra note 42, at 413-18. 
   82  Green, supra note 13, at 147. Green also notes, consistent with the 
previous paragraph, that employers might seek to construct 
“heterogeneous work and decisionmaking groups.” See id. 
   83  Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 496 (2001). 
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prised by the simple fact that there were significant disparities in as-
signments by sex.) 
 
 It is reasonable to suppose that steps such as these would reduce 
the underlying level of implicit bias as well as implicitly biased behav-
ior; if so, then the law’s inducement of employers to adopt such steps 
is an illustration of indirect debiasing. But such steps may in some 
cases simply insulate outcomes from the effects of an underlying level 
of implicit bias, in which case they are insulating rather than debiasing 
approaches within our framework.  
 
 We do not take a position here on the relative effectiveness of the 
many diverse means by which employers might seek to reduce implicit 
bias, implicitly biased behavior, or both in response to effective prohi-
bition of implicitly biased behavior. It is uncertain whether approaches 
centered in System II would do much to reduce the phenomena; so too, 
the potential limits on some of the System I approaches were explored 
in Part II.B above. Here we simply highlight the likelihood that much-
discussed reform efforts with respect to policing implicitly biased be-
havior would produce responses that, in turn, would tend to reduce the 
level of implicit bias. 
 
2. The Legal Treatment of Affirmative Action Plans 
 
 A second example of an indirect debiasing mechanism is the legal 
treatment of affirmative action plans. We have emphasized that gov-
ernment might engage in direct debiasing through the adoption of such 
plans. It follows that in tolerating such plans (whether imposed by 
public or by private actors), the law is engaging in a form of indirect 
debiasing; that is, regulated actors are permitted to take steps that, in 
turn, tend to reduce implicit bias.  
 
 Kang and Banaji argue in this Symposium that a proper interpre-
tation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII would allow em-
ployers to engage in affirmative action in order to produce a diverse 
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workforce and thereby reduce implicit bias.84 Importantly, Kang and 
Banaji explain that these forms of affirmative action are distinct from 
the “role model” arguments that have met with mixed reception in the 
courts; in the debiasing approach, the emphasis is on the attitudes and 
behavior of those outside, rather than within, the traditionally under-
represented group.85  
 
 To clarify, the emphasis in the present discussion is on creating 
legal structures within which actors may choose to adopt debiasing 
mechanisms; by contrast, our discussion in Part II.B.4 above involved 
the affirmative choice by the state to adopt such mechanisms itself. In 
our terminology, the state engages in direct debiasing when it chooses 
to adopt an affirmative action plan that directly reduces implicit bias. 
By contrast, the state can be said engage in indirect debiasing when it 
enables actors (including government itself) to adopt such affirmative 
action plans. In one case, the legal policy itself debiases, while in the 
other case the legal policy provides a space in which regulated actors 
may adopt debiasing mechanisms. Of course, insofar as government 
affirmative action plans are concerned, both types of debiasing will be 
in play.  
 
D. Summary 
 
 In a variety of ways, existing law and policy seek to respond to 
the problem of implicit bias; imaginable reforms could do far more. 
Some strategies focus on insulating outcomes from the effects of im-
plicit bias, which itself is taken largely as a given. But many actual 
and imaginable legal approaches instead act to reduce implicit bias. 
Such effects occur directly when the law requires steps that tend to 
reduce implicit bias (Part II.B). They occur indirectly when the law 
encourages or enables regulated actors to craft steps that, in turn, re-
 
   84  Kang & Banaji, supra note 47. For an initial discussion of the 
idea that legal policy in the form of government affirmative action 
reduces implicit bias through increased population diversity, see Jolls 
& Sunstein, supra note 73.   
   85  See Kang & Banaji, supra note 47. 
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duce implicit bias (Part II.C). Table 1 provides a summary of these 
alternative approaches. 
 
 Note that while our focus throughout is on the law’s role in debi-
asing in response to implicit bias, private individuals may act, apart 
from law, in an effort to debias themselves.86 Such steps represent 
nonlegal alternatives to the problem of implicit bias. For purposes of 
legal scholarship, however, the central question, and the question em-
phasized in Table 1, is the role of law in combating implicit bias. 
 
 
 
   86  See id.  
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Table 1:  Debiasing and Other Legal Responses to Implicit Bias 
 
Type of Law 
Insulating Mecha-
nisms:  Law or policy 
insulates outcomes 
from the effects of 
implicit bias 
  
Direct Debiasing 
Mechanisms:  Spe-
cific legal or policy 
requirements di-
rectly reduce im-
plicit bias 
Indirect Debiasing 
Mechanisms:  Law 
encourages or en-
ables regulated ac-
tors to take steps 
that reduce implicit 
bias 
1) Existing govern-
ment affirmative ac-
tion policies’ 
overriding of “merit” 
evaluations that will 
tend to be implicitly 
biased (Part II.A)87
  
1) Existing antidis-
crimination law’s 
prohibition on con-
sciously biased be-
havior and resulting 
positive effect on 
workplace, educa-
tional, or other di-
versity (Part II.B.1)88
1) Existing antidis-
crimination law’s 
prohibition on im-
plicitly biased be-
havior (to the extent 
such a prohibition 
exists) or extension 
of existing antidis-
crimination law’s 
prohibitions to cover 
implicitly biased be-
havior (Part II.C.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
   87  This argument follows directly from the discussion in id.; in 
McGinley, supra note 48, at 1044-46, 1048-49; and in Selmi, supra 
note 48, at 1284-89, 1297.  
   88  See Jolls, supra note 42.  
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Table 1 (cont.):  Debiasing and Other Legal Responses to Implicit 
Bias 
 
Type of Law 
Insulating Mecha-
nisms:  Law or policy 
insulates outcomes 
from the effects of 
implicit bias 
  
Direct Debiasing 
Mechanisms:  Spe-
cific legal or policy 
requirements di-
rectly reduce im-
plicit bias 
Indirect Debiasing 
Mechanisms:  Law 
encourages or en-
ables regulated ac-
tors to take steps 
that reduce implicit 
bias 
2) Antidiscrimination 
law’s framework for 
assessing the legality 
of affirmative action 
policies; these poli-
cies may override 
“merit” evaluations 
that will tend to be 
implicitly biased 
(Part II.A)89
  
2) Existing antidis-
crimination law’s 
prohibition on hos-
tile workplace, edu-
cational, or other 
environments (Part 
II.B.2)90
2) Antidiscrimina-
tion law’s frame-
work for assessing 
the legality of af-
firmative action 
policies; these poli-
cies may encourage 
employers to adopt 
diversity-oriented 
hiring practices that 
reduce implicit bias 
(Part II.C.2) 91
 
 3) Extension of ex-
isting antidiscrimi-
nation law to require 
employers seeking 
to avoid vicarious 
liability to foster di-
versity in the physi-
cal environment 
(Part II.B.3) 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
   89  See Kang & Banaji, supra note 47. 
   90  See Jolls, supra note 42.  
   91  See Kang & Banaji, supra note 47.  
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Table 1 (cont.):  Debiasing and Other Legal Responses 
to Implicit Bias 
 
Type of Law 
Insulating Mecha-
nisms:  Law or policy 
insulates outcomes 
from the effects of 
implicit bias 
  
Direct Debiasing 
Mechanisms:  Spe-
cific legal or policy 
requirements di-
rectly reduce im-
plicit bias 
Indirect Debiasing 
Mechanisms:  Law 
encourages or en-
ables regulated ac-
tors to take steps 
that reduce implicit 
bias 
 
 4) Existing state af-
firmative action 
policies’ positive 
effect on workplace, 
educational, or other 
diversity (Part 
II.B.4)92
 
 
 
 
E. Debiasing of Whom? 
 
 In the various debiasing interventions discussed above, the pre-
sumed targets of the debiasing were actors at risk of displaying im-
plicit bias or implicitly biased behavior toward members of a protected 
group. But the contribution of Gary Blasi and John Jost to this Sympo-
sium illustrates that such behavior is only one part of a complete 
analysis. As Blasi and Jost describe, those who are victims of implic-
itly biased behavior may often accept and even justify, rather than ob-
ject to, such behavior—a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of 
“system justification.”93 In our view, Blasi and Jost should be under-
stood to be supplementing a great deal of work that explores the gen-
                                                                                                                   
   92  See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 73.  
   93  Blasi & Jost, supra note 45. 
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eral possibility of “adaptive preferences”—preferences that have 
adapted to existing injustice.94  
 
 In the employment context, for example, George Akerlof and 
Robert Dickens argue that employees may fail to confront the real 
magnitude of occupational risks, simply because it is so distressing to 
do so.95 Speaking in broader terms, Amartya Sen has long emphasized 
that “deprived people . . . may even adjust their desires and expecta-
tions to what they unambitiously see as feasible.”96 Describing the hi-
erarchical nature of pre-Revolutionary America, historian Gordon 
Wood writes that those “in lowly stations . . . developed what was 
called a ‘down look,’” and “knew their place and willingly walked 
while gentlefolk rode; and as yet they seldom expressed any burning 
desire to change places with their betters.”97 In Wood’s account, it is 
impossible to “comprehend the distinctiveness of that premodern 
world until we appreciate the extent to which many ordinary people 
still accepted their own lowliness.”98 If Blasi and Jost are right, then 
the modern world is not entirely different from its premodern counter-
part.  
 
 In addition to the general evidence that they muster, the results of 
the IAT itself provide some support for system justification. As we 
noted above, a significant number (roughly half) of African-Americans 
show the same implicit racial bias on the IAT as whites.99  
 
 In this light, an important potential benefit of the debiasing ap-
proaches described above is that they may reduce levels of implicit 
bias in victims as well as perpetrators of implicitly biased behavior. If, 
 
   94  See generally JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983). 
   95  See George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic 
Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 
(1982). 
   96  AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 63 (1999). 
   97  GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 29-30 (1991).  
   98  Id. at 30. 
   99  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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for example, population diversity reduces implicit bias among those 
present—whatever their particular group—then such diversity should 
not only reduce implicitly biased behavior by perpetrators, but also 
increase resistance to such behavior by victims. Likewise, if avoiding 
sexually explicit visual displays in the workplace reduces levels of im-
plicit sex stereotyping among women as well as men, then avoiding 
such displays may affect women’s, as well as men’s, behavior. Debias-
ing victims is undoubtedly a massive issue for law and policy. Our 
suggestion here is that many efforts to debias perpetrators help simul-
taneously to counteract the problem that Blasi and Jost explore in this 
Symposium. 
 
 
III. 
Normative Questions 
 
 The central emphasis of Part II was the way in which antidis-
crimination law and policy either does or could act to reduce implicit 
bias. While the analysis thus far has been purely descriptive, these 
sorts of debiasing strategies raise important normative questions. Con-
sideration of those questions turns out to be importantly assisted by the 
parallels from in Part I between implicit bias and the heuristics and 
biases emphasized in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. 
 
A. Thought Control? 
 
 No doubt the most obvious normative question raised by legal at-
tempts to reduce people’s implicit bias is whether such debiasing 
strategies amount to objectionable government “thought control.”  
Like the other contributors to this Symposium, we believe that implicit 
bias is a serious problem and that it is exceedingly important for the 
law to attempt to address implicitly biased behavior. Often, as noted 
above, the most plausible responses to the problem of implicit bias 
will be legal steps that reduce such bias. But any use of the law to this 
end raises immediate normative questions. Is it appropriate for gov-
ernment to seek to shape how people think about their coworkers or 
fellow students?  
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 In many domains, some government control over what people 
think is simply unavoidable. Illustrations from current law, outside of 
the antidiscrimination context, are easily imagined. Whenever the gov-
ernment is so much as presenting information to people in response to 
factual misjudgments, government is making decisions about the man-
ner of presentation, and these choices inevitably will affect how its 
citizens perceive the world around them.100 But in the domain of civil 
rights addressed in this Symposium, it may be difficult to disentangle 
factual mistakes in judgment—where changing what people think is 
common and frequently unobjectionable in a wide range of do-
mains101—from genuine preferences and values with which govern-
ment may have no business engaging. While government, on this 
view, may be entitled to discourage conduct based on such preferences 
and values, it might well seem illegitimate for it to seek to alter the 
preferences and values themselves.  
 
 We emphasize two main points here. First, it is plainly unobjec-
tionable for government to act in response to factual errors; if people 
are simply mistaken as a matter of fact in associating a particular trait 
or attribute with members of one race, attempts at government correc-
tion do not raise especially profound issues. Information campaigns, 
either for risk regulation or for antidiscrimination law, are not objec-
tionable in principle.102 Our discussion in Part I suggested how implicit 
bias may sometimes be akin to a factual error. If implicit bias leads 
people to make such errors in assessing others, then the government 
may legitimately seek to correct those errors. 
 
 Second, it is equally unobjectionable for government to ban many 
forms of biased behavior—whether consciously biased or implicitly 
biased—even if one effect of the ban is to alter people’s values and 
preferences. Of course, this suggestion does not mean that government 
may use the force of law to target beliefs rather than behavior—even if 
the beliefs are targeted as a way of preventing behavior. Suppose, for 
example, that a workplace features demeaning pictures and jokes that 
 
   100  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 232.   
   101  See id. 
   102  For discussion in the context of risky consumer products, see id. 
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are likely to increase both implicit bias and implicitly biased behavior 
against female employees or students. Suppose then that regulators 
attempt to eliminate those pictures and jokes because of their likely 
negative effects; perhaps regulators are aware that relevant conditions 
will likely activate System I, in a way that has concrete effects on 
women in the workplace. It is not unreasonable to see a problem with 
regulating speech (posters and jokes) on the ground that it is likely to 
lead to biased behavior. 
 
 There is, however, another possibility, rooted most obviously in 
our discussion of hostile environment liability in Part II.B.2 above. In 
some circumstances, workplace practices (such as posters and jokes) 
that are likely to produce biased behavior are themselves independ-
ently a form of unlawful discrimination. Suppose, for example, that 
demeaning pictures and jokes are pervasive in a certain workplace, in 
a way that creates a hostile environment for women. As described 
above, the pictures and jokes are then directly targeted as unlawful un-
der existing antidiscrimination law. If there were a compelling concern 
with government “thought control” under this law, one would natu-
rally expect successful challenges to it under the First Amendment, but 
in fact the standard view is that the legal prohibition here is consistent 
with First Amendment principles.103 As this example illustrates, the 
law tolerates some government prohibitions on discriminatory behav-
ior, even when they relate directly to speech, despite their potential 
effects on people’s values and preferences. 
 
 We do not mean in this space to settle all of the dimensions of the 
“thought control” objection to government efforts to reduce implicit 
bias. But this much is clear. The normative problems are least severe 
when government is counteracting either factual mistakes or discrimi-
natory behavior such as hostile work environments; and if efforts to 
combat such forms of biased behavior also reduce implicit bias, no one 
should complain in light of existing law.  
 
   103  See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2304-06 (1999); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Sexual 
Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That 
Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21-51. 
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 One final point. Many people are both surprised and embarrassed 
to find that they show implicit bias, and their bias conflicts with their 
explicit judgments and their moral commitments.104  As we have sug-
gested, it is likely to be the case that some people engage in biased be-
havior inadvertently or despite their own ideals. Such people want, in 
a sense, to be debiased, but their own conscious efforts are at most a 
partial help. Many normative objections to debiasing strategies, as 
forms of objectionable government meddling, are weakened to the ex-
tent that such strategies help people to remove implicit bias that they 
themselves reject on principle. 
 
B. Heterogeneous Actors  
 
 Without more, the “thought control” concerns discussed above 
might, for some, argue in favor of insulating over debiasing strategies 
when insulating approaches—which do not seek to alter people’s un-
derlying level of bias—are feasible. However, insulating approaches 
lack a key advantage of debiasing strategies: debiasing often has the 
virtue of avoiding significant effects on those who do not exhibit bias 
in the first place.105  
 
 Recall our earlier illustration of consumer optimism bias; gov-
ernment, believing that consumers often underestimate the likelihood 
of injury from risky products, restricts consumer choice in a variety of 
ways.106 Such restrictions introduce new distortions in outcomes for 
those who did not err in the first instance, as products are banned, 
more expensive, or otherwise less available to them. By contrast, debi-
asing techniques are likely to affect those who are biased without 
much affecting those who are not.107 So too in the context of antidis-
crimination law: debiasing approaches target implicit bias for reduc-
 
   104  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
   105  See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 226, 228-30. 
   106  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
   107  See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 228-30. 
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tion and thus are unlikely to affect those who initially do not show im-
plicit bias.108  
 
 To illustrate the basic point here, return to the alternative analyses 
of government affirmative action plans in Part II above. One analysis 
emphasizes insulation. On this account, affirmative action plans may 
protect outcomes from the effects of implicit bias—itself taken as a 
given—by granting discrete preferences to members of a particular 
group.109 Here, as applied to a particular decisionmaker who in fact 
harbors no implicit bias, the government’s action will introduce a dis-
tortion in, rather than a corrective to, decisionmaking; depending on 
the nature of the affirmative action plan the alteration may be signifi-
cant.110 If a given decisionmaker evaluates an African-American in a 
wholly unbiased fashion but the candidate nonetheless receives a 
thumb on the scale under an affirmative action plan, then the plan 
causes, rather than insulates against, raced-based decisionmaking. 
 
 The analysis differs with respect to the debiasing account of af-
firmative action. On this account, affirmative action, by increasing 
population diversity, may reduce implicit bias—but there is no reason 
to think the increased population diversity will significantly alter the 
views of those who did not show implicit bias in the first place. The 
perceptions of a decisionmaker who already has no trouble envisioning 
African-Americans in authority roles are unlikely to move substan-
tially in response to increased population diversity in the organization. 
Of course empirical testing would be important to verify this conjec-
ture, but debiasing solutions at least hold out the possibility of leaving 
unaffected or less affected the decisionmaking of those who were not 
biased in the first instance. The use of a System I response to a System 
 
   108  We noted above, for instance, that substantial numbers of 
African-Americans do not show significant levels of implicit bias. See 
supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
   109  See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (citing Kang & 
Banaji, supra note 47). 
   110  Again, Kang and Banaji ultimately limit their analysis to specific 
forms of affirmative action, see supra note 47, so this problem would 
not be significant under their analysis. 
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I problem may be able to leave relatively untouched those not exhibit-
ing the System I problem in the first instance.111  
 
 The system justification context discussed above provides another 
example of the potential advantage of debiasing approaches. Consider 
the suggestion of Blasi and Jost  that, as a result of system justification 
tendencies, victims of biased behavior will often not mount legal chal-
lenges to such behavior.112 If so, one could imagine responding with 
policies greatly lowering the legal barriers to bringing such challenges. 
But such steps would naturally tend to affect the frequency of legal 
challenges even outside the set of cases in which system justification 
was depressing legal challenges in the first instance. Again, debiasing 
strategies may avoid such distortions in the behavior of those not ex-
hibiting bias in the first instance. 
 
 
IV. 
Conclusion 
 
 Antidiscrimination law, no less than any other area of law, should 
be based on a realistic understanding of human behavior. If consumers 
underreact to certain risks, the law should take their underreactions 
into account. And if individuals act on the basis of implicit bias 
against African-Americans or other groups, without awareness that 
they are doing so, the law should seek to respond, if only because 
similarly situated people are not being treated similarly. As in risk-
related behavior, so too with implicitly biased behavior:  System I, in-
volving rapid, intuitive responses, is often responsible for people’s be-
havior, and it can lead them badly astray. 
 
 
   111  Note, however, that as the example of government affirmative 
action illustrates, the same measure may sometimes have both 
insulating and debiasing features; our point here is that the debiasing 
features distinctively hold out the promise of leaving unchanged the 
decisionmaking of those who were not biased in the first place. 
   112  See Blasi & Jost, supra note 45. 
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 We have suggested the importance of distinguishing between two 
responses to implicit bias. Sometimes the legal system does and should 
pursue a strategy of insulation—for example, by protecting consumers 
against their own mistakes or by banning or otherwise limiting the ef-
fects of implicitly biased behavior. But sometimes the legal system 
does and should attempt to debias those who suffer from consumer 
error—or who might treat people in a biased manner. In many do-
mains, debiasing strategies provide a preferable and less intrusive so-
lution. In the context of antidiscrimination law, implicit bias presents a 
particularly severe challenge; we have suggested that several existing 
doctrines now operate to reduce that bias, either directly or indirectly, 
and that these existing doctrines do not on that account run into con-
vincing normative objections.  
 
 It is now clear that implicit bias is widespread, and it is increas-
ingly apparent that actual behavior is often affected by it, in violation 
of the principles that underlie antidiscrimination law. The question for 
the future, illuminatingly explored by the contributors to this Sympo-
sium, is how the law might better deal with that problem.  
